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Review
Potential role of wildlife in the USA in 
the event of a foot-and-mouth disease 
virus incursion
Vienna R Brown,  1 Sarah N Bevins2
Abstract
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is caused by foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) which affects domestic 
and wild cloven-hoofed species. The FMD-free status of the USA and the tremendous economic impact of a 
virus incursion motivated the development of this evaluation of the potential role of wildlife in the event of a 
virus introduction. Additionally, this manuscript contains a summary of US vulnerabilities for viral incursion 
and persistence which focuses specifically on the possible role of wildlife. The legal movement of susceptible 
live animals, animal products, by-products and animal feed containing animal products pose a risk of virus 
introduction and spread. Additionally, the illegal movement of FMD-susceptible animals and their products and 
an act of bioterrorism present additional routes where FMDV could be introduced to the USA. Therefore, robust 
surveillance and rapid diagnostics in the face of a possible introduction are essential for detecting and controlling 
FMD as quickly as possible. Wildlife species and feral pigs present an added complexity in the case of FMDV 
introduction as they are typically not closely monitored or managed and there are significant logistical concerns 
pertaining to disease surveillance and control in these populations. Recommendations highlight the need to 
address existing knowledge gaps relative to the potential role of wildlife in FMDV introduction events.
Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is caused by foot-and-
mouth disease virus (FMDV) which infects cloven-
hoofed animals, including cattle, sheep, goats and pigs, 
as well as various wild species.1 The primary routes of 
transmission are inhalation of infectious virus, direct 
and indirect contact with infected animals and exposure 
to contaminated fomites. Clinical disease manifests as 
vesicle formation on the tongue, hard palate, dental pad, 
lips, gums, muzzle, coronary band, interdigital space 
and (in females) on the teats.2–4 These lesions lead to 
weight loss, lameness, lethargy and a reduction in milk 
yield.5 Additionally, death due to myocardial necrosis 
has been reported in young animals.6 There have been 
eight different outbreaks in the USA since the first 
reported introduction in 1870, with the last reported 
case of FMD occurring in 1929 in California.7 There are 
seven immunological serotypes of FMDV, each with a 
multitude of topotypes, genetic lineages and strains 
enzootic in Africa, Asia and parts of South America.8–11 
FMD is considered to be one of the most important 
animal diseases in the world because of the significant 
financial burden associated with this disease in both 
endemic and FMD-free countries.12 Estimates indicate 
that FMD costs between US$6.5 and US$21 billion 
annually in endemic countries, with the principal costs 
attributed to production losses and vaccination and 
outbreaks of FMD  can cost FMD-free countries more 
than US$1.5 billion annually.13 A number of models 
approximate the cost associated with an introduction 
of FMD into the USA; however, outcomes are variable 
as they are dependent on a number of factors, 
including species of detection; size of the operation 
implicated in the index case; presence or absence of 
transmission events to other livestock of the same 
species, an alternative species, or wildlife or feral 
animals; geographical location within the country; and 
rapidity of detection and deployment of disease control 
efforts.14–16
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Notably, based on information from the 2001 
FMD outbreak in the UK, the total cost may, in fact, 
be much larger.17 More than 6,000,000 animals were 
depopulated and the direct costs to the public and 
private sectors combined are approximated at over 
US$10.5 billion. This outbreak was initiated through 
the feeding of contaminated, untreated waste to pigs 
and was then introduced to sheep on a nearby property 
and readily disseminated through the marketing and 
movement of sheep.18 19 In 2010, there was an FMD 
outbreak in Japan in a densely cattle and pig populated 
region and 290,000 animals were depopulated in order 
to control the epidemic, resulting in compensation costs 
of US$550 million  for the value of culled livestock.20 
Furthermore, South Korea experienced five outbreaks 
of FMD between 2000 and 2011 which resulted in 
over US$3.5 billion in economic losses and ultimately 
resulted in the loss of FMD-free status.21
FMD is not a zoonotic pathogen but it is a reportable 
animal disease to the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) and virus detection can bring about 
substantial trade restrictions and tremendous economic 
losses. This manuscript provides a brief description of 
domestic livestock production within the continental 
USA as well as an overview of FMDV-susceptible feral 
and wildlife species on the landscape. While our 
primary focus is on FMD in wildlife, management 
of domestic livestock was included as the livestock-
wildlife interface is a risk for spillover which would 
significantly complicate control strategies in the event 
of a virus introduction. A summary of vulnerabilities 
for US viral introduction and persistence is provided 
and, ultimately, recommendations are made for further 
research based on determined gaps in knowledge.
Domestic livestock
Domestic livestock, specifically cattle, sheep, goats and 
pigs, are all susceptible to infection with FMDV and their 
density and distribution across the USA, in addition to 
commonly used management practices, are important 
components that would play a role in the event of an 
FMDV introduction into the USA. The number of cattle 
and calves in the USA is estimated to be 93 million 
animals with the beef industry valued at nearly 
$68 billion22 and the dairy industry, as measured by farm 
gate receipts, was estimated to be valued at $34 billion 
in 2016.23 Cattle are found in all 50 states with Texas, 
Nebraska, Kansas, California and Oklahoma serving as 
the top five states for cattle and calf production in 2015, 
accounting for nearly 40  per  cent of all production. 
Sales of sheep and goats and their products totalled 
nearly $705 million in the USA in 2007, according to 
the 2007 Census of Agriculture Report, reported by 
the National Agriculture Statistics Service.24 The sheep 
population in the USA was conservatively estimated to 
be 5.2 million head in January 2018 and the majority 
of sheep are raised west of the Mississippi River with 
Texas, California, Colorado, Wyoming and Utah being 
the five largest producers of sheep and their products.25 
The goat population in the USA was approximated at 
3.5 million animals that are used for meat, milk and 
fibre purposes based on data obtained from the 2002 
agricultural census.26 Texas, Tennessee, California, 
Oklahoma and Georgia are the top five goat-producing 
states and California has the largest population of dairy 
goats in the USA. The estimated population of domestic 
pigs in the USA is 65 million, with Iowa, North Carolina, 
Minnesota, Illinois and Indiana being the five top pork-
producing states annually.27 The 2012 USDA Census of 
Agriculture reported the hog and pig industry to have 
sales of $22.5 billion.
For ruminants, the majority of meat animals are 
managed on pasture or rangeland for the duration 
of their lives or until the final stage whence they are 
congregated in a feedlot setting for finishing, whereas 
dairy animals are typically managed in an open lot 
or barn setting to facilitate milk collection. There is 
an opportunity for interaction with other domestic 
livestock or wildlife in either setting, although the 
pasture or range grazed animals would be more likely 
to encounter feral or wild species. It is important to 
note that outbreaks in animals grazed on pasture or 
rangeland would be much more difficult to control, 
either via vaccination or depopulation, as compared 
with concentrated animals in a drylot or feedlot setting. 
The commercial pig industry is managed entirely 
indoors with no access to, or interaction with, other 
domestic livestock or wildlife; however, backyard pigs 
may have ample opportunity to interact with a variety 
of domestic and wild species.
Retrospective analyses from the 2001 outbreak 
of FMD in Great Britain determined that the spatial 
distribution, size and species composition on farms 
heavily influenced the observed pattern of disease 
spread and regional variability.28 The initial spread 
of the outbreak is believed to have been driven by the 
movement of sheep, likely partially attributable to 
difficulty detecting FMD infection in sheep as compared 
with cattle or pigs.29 Several modelling analyses 
demonstrated that markets, and other high-density, 
high-dissemination facilities, such as dealers and 
slaughterhouses, played an instrumental role in viral 
spread.29 30 Simulations suggest that the contamination 
of markets is crucial for a large epidemic event29 and 
not surprisingly, reduced animal mixing was found to 
decrease the number of cases, the number of culled 
animals, and shorten the overall duration of the 
epidemic.28 Also of consequence, cattle were determined 
to be a key species in the 2001 FMD outbreak after 
initial spread by sheep.31 Resultant from this finding, 
Buhnerkempe and colleagues32 modelled the impact 
of movement and animal density on a nationwide 
FMD-like disease outbreak in the USA and found that 
cattle movement restrictions from infected counties 
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were found to effectively contain outbreaks as compared 
with a national moratorium on animal movement. These 
findings suggest that animal movements from infected 
regions have the capacity to contribute to an outbreak 
event and effectively disseminate the virus.
Feral pigs
Feral pigs (Sus scrofa) include released and escaped 
domestic pigs, truly wild European boars and their 
hybrids, and are believed to have become established in 
the continental USA in the 1400s.33–35 Experts estimate 
that over 6 million feral pigs roam within at least 35 
states in the USA with California, Florida, Oklahoma 
and Texas having the largest populations.36 A side-by-
side experimental infection with FMDV was performed 
to compare the clinical manifestation and transmission 
capacity of feral and domestic pigs. Domestic and 
feral pigs were both found to be highly susceptible to 
infection with FMDV and developed similar clinical 
signs, although feral pigs had higher tolerance and 
the vesicular lesions were more difficult to detect as a 
result of their thicker, darker skin.37 This experimental 
infection demonstrated that feral pigs are potential 
hosts for FMDV due to their acute susceptibility, their 
capacity to shed large quantities of virus orally, their 
close interactions with domestic livestock, and their 
unrestrained, minimally managed lifestyle.
Wildlife species
Along with domestic livestock, wild cloven-hoofed 
species are also susceptible to FMDV and the USA is 
home to a number of wild ungulates. Experimental 
infections have demonstrated susceptibility in white-
tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus),38 39 mule deer 
(Odocoileus hemionus),40 elk (Cervus canadensis),41 
bison (Bison bison)41 and pronghorn antelope 
(Antilocapra americana).42 All of these species show 
similar clinical signs as domestic livestock and are 
able to transmit the virus to uninfected animals of 
the same species and naïve cattle, less elk which 
were demonstrated to be more resistant to infection.41 
Despite acute susceptibility to FMDV in many wild North 
American ungulates, it is unlikely these species would 
serve as a true viral reservoir.43 More probably, the 
virus would spill over from infected domestic livestock 
to susceptible wild ungulates, would be transmitted 
through the herd and then would be self-limiting as 
the animals became infected and then recovered. This 
is supported by historical observations where FMDV 
disappears from local wildlife populations following 
its eradication in domestic species.43 However, 
frequent interactions between infected wildlife and 
domestic livestock could result in recurrent spillover 
and spillback events which could heavily complicate 
virus control. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine 
with certainty the role wildlife may or may not play in 
a natural setting as there are a number of factors that 
are not accounted for in experimental infections such 
as density of each susceptible species on the landscape, 
intraspecies interaction, proximity of wildlife species to 
one another and to domestic livestock, as well as factors 
related to the environment that may affect viral stability 
and transmissibility.
Determining population estimates for each wild 
cloven-hoofed animal in the USA is a tremendous 
undertaking and a national database with this 
information is not available. In the event of an outbreak, 
state game agencies would have population estimates 
for ungulates in that particular region which could be 
used to develop a strategy for managing exposed and 
infected wildlife.
Emergency preparedness for the USA
The government and private animal sectors of the 
USA are acutely aware of the consequences that may 
result from the introduction of FMDV and as such, a 
variety of foreign animal disease and FMD experts 
have assembled documents that address the different 
components of an outbreak scenario.44–48 The Red 
Book states that a wildlife management plan would 
be developed immediately following the identification 
of an FMD index case in livestock.46 The density and 
distribution of susceptible wildlife species would 
be evaluated as well as the social structure, habitat, 
contact with livestock and potential duration of viral 
exposure as part of a larger wildlife risk assessment. 
Additionally, documents providing guidance on 
wildlife management in the USA in the event of an FMD 
outbreak were developed in 2001 by the International 
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies and by the 
USDOI National Park Service in response to the FMD 
outbreak in the UK.49 Updating and adding detail to 
these guidelines for FMD surveillance and response 
in wildlife could be beneficial for future emergency 
response operations. Depending on the findings of the 
risk assessment, wildlife management principles and 
tools would be used to reduce the interaction of wildlife 
and livestock and to prevent wildlife from spreading 
disease.
Additionally, the North American Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease Vaccine Bank at Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center maintains an inventory of antigens that are 
derived from the virus strains that are currently 
circulating globally.50 However, it is not logistically 
feasible to maintain an up-to-date vaccine bank with all 
the possible FMD serotypes and subtypes on a scale that 
would allow for immediate vaccination of all animals 
involved in the outbreak or those potentially exposed.
The current vaccines available for FMDV are 
inactivated whole  virus preparations that are 
supplemented with adjuvant.1 These vaccines have 
been found to be highly efficacious; however, there are 
concerns as their preparation requires the inactivation 
of large volumes of live, active virus, and thus a high 
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biocontainment facility. Furthermore, these vaccines are 
sometimes contaminated with non-structural proteins 
making it difficult to differentiate between vaccinated 
and naturally infected animals (also known as DIVA); 
however, continued work has led to the development of 
more robust DIVA diagnostics.51
Importantly, in 2012 the first FMD vaccine delivered 
by replication-defective human adenovirus type 5 vector 
(Ad5-FMD) was licensed for use in cattle in the USA in 
the event of an outbreak scenario.52 53 This vaccine was 
produced as the result of a large public-private enterprise 
between the Department of Homeland Security, USDA, 
Antelope Valley Biologics and GenVec. The Ad5-FMD 
vaccine is engineered to encode structural proteins Vp0, 
Vp1 and Vp3 from the A24 Cruzeiro FMDV strain and 
contains an adjuvant.52 53 This method is advantageous 
for several reasons, including safety which allows the 
vaccine to be produced on the US  mainland and the 
ability to differentiate vaccinated animals from those 
naturally infected. However, this new, conditionally 
licensed vaccine can only be used for strains that are 
heterologous to the A24 Cruzeiro strain.
The Department of Homeland Security is currently 
producing master seed viruses for 10 other serotypes 
considered to be high and medium-priority strains 
by the World Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-
Mouth Disease using the human adenovirus platform. 
Limited investments are being made in multivalent and 
combinatorial vaccines. The Department of Homeland 
Security has also evaluated several other rapid vaccine 
platforms for use in an outbreak.
From a diagnostic perspective, both ELISA and 
quantitative PCR are highly sensitive and swift 
techniques that can be used on samples derived from 
any species and allow for the rapid detection of antigen 
or amplification of a select region of RNA, respectively.54 
Virus isolation methods are used to detect live, 
infectious virus which can be subjected to further 
assays to determine the exact serotype or subtype of 
FMDV, although this method is much slower.55
Despite detailed regulations, extensive documents 
outlining proposed control and eradication strategies, 
the presence of a variety of FMDV antigens in the 
Vaccine Bank and diagnostics that can be used across 
a variety of species, an FMD outbreak in the USA may 
be difficult to contain. Animal rearing in high-density 
settings and routine transportation could facilitate an 
FMDV outbreak on a large scale that would likely be 
difficult to control and eradicate.
Summary of US vulnerabilities for FMDV introduction or 
persistence
Risk of introduction into the USA
FMDV could be introduced into the USA through a 
variety of routes. A disease outbreak is most likely to 
result from (1) the legal movement of live animals or their 
products, by-products or animal feed containing animal 
products, (2) the illegal movement of live animals and 
their products, or (3) an intentional viral release in an 
act of bioterrorism. These routes are deemed to be the 
most probable means of introduction because of factors 
related to infected animal shedding patterns (quantity 
and duration), viral stability, historical viral outbreaks 
related to the feeding of FMDV-contaminated feed 
to susceptible animal species (which has resulted in 
several FMDV importations into the USA, including the 
1924 outbreak) and current global instability.56 Knight-
Jones and colleagues57 describe risk reduction to be 
closely linked to FMD incidence in both neighbouring 
and trade countries, highlighting the importance of 
regulations surrounding the importation of animals and 
their products. They further conclude that unregulated 
movement (illegal importation) poses an important 
threat of introduction as well.
Legal movement of live animals
Live animal importation serves as a potential route 
of introduction because of the acute susceptibility of 
a large number of domestic and wild  cloven-hoofed 
animals and the patterns of viral shedding which 
present an opportunity for transmission. Live cloven-
hoofed animals are not permitted to be imported from 
any country that is endemic for FMD; however, this rule 
may change owing to concerns that many important, 
exotic species in zoos are becoming inbred and new 
genes are necessary to revive the US captive population. 
Currently, the USA only imports live cloven-hoofed 
animals from Mexico, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, and zoo animals from FMD-free countries (9 
CFR Part 93).
During 2015, the Southern and Northern Border 
port directors, respectively, report that cattle were the 
only cloven-hoofed animals that were imported from 
Mexico, and cattle, small ruminants, pigs, bison and 
wild animals were the ungulates imported from Canada. 
The vast majority of cattle imported from Mexico were 
destined for meat production with small numbers 
imported for research, competition, breeding or rodeo 
use. Cloven-hoofed animals imported from Canada 
were destined primarily for breeding and feeding 
purposes and direct to slaughter. In addition to Mexico 
and Canada, the USA accepts cattle and small ruminant 
imports from Australia and New Zealand following 
pre-export and post-export quarantines. No cattle or 
small ruminants were imported from Australia or New 
Zealand in 2015.58
A wide variety of commonly maintained zoo animals 
and wildlife species are susceptible to infection with 
FMDV, specifically the order Artiodactyla which includes 
giraffes, antelopes, sheep, goats, camels and camelids, 
and pigs, among others.59 Official zoos tend to adhere 
to principles of biosecurity and any unusual clinical 
signs or an actual disease outbreak would likely be 
readily detected. Furthermore, these facilities typically 
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have a perimeter fence to prevent domestic animals 
and native wildlife species from interacting with zoo 
animals. However, wildlife reserves, sanctuaries, 
parks and high  fence properties (which are facilities 
with high fences that typically contain animals used 
for hunting) often contain both native and non-native 
wildlife species that are susceptible to FMDV infection 
which are managed much less intensively and may be 
rarely, if ever, observed by personnel with expertise in 
disease recognition and diagnosis. Moreover, it is likely 
that the species confined within the fenced area are 
comingled and that they have contact with out-of-fence 
wildlife species. In many instances, animals within 
these properties are able to escape and become feral 
where they certainly could interact with both domestic 
livestock and wildlife species.
The process for the movement of captive wild 
species across state  lines and between facilities 
is highly variable because of disparities in state 
laws, the species being transported and the 
specific regulations associated with both facilities 
involved in the transaction. Limited oversight 
on many animal rearing facilities may result in 
comingling of FMD-susceptible animals that are 
both native and exotic, with some potentially being 
captive while others are truly wild, and fencing 
may be inadequate to prevent accidental escape. 
Additionally, in the event of an outbreak scenario 
it would be extremely challenging to ascertain the 
breadth and magnitude of the role wildlife may play 
as both native and non-native species would be a 
concern. High  fence properties containing exotic 
and wild species from abroad often have animals 
that escape from this captive setting which could 
pose a tremendous threat to native species and 
significantly complicate a disease outbreak.60–63 
For example, there are a number of breeding 
populations of exotic species, such as oryx (Oryx 
species), Barbary sheep (Ammotragus lervia) and 
nilgai antelope (Boselaphus tragocamelus) in the 
USA, especially Texas. Of note, nilgai and oryx are 
acutely susceptible to FMDV and develop severe 
lesions when infected.64 65 Furthermore, nilgai are 
well established in parts of Texas and north-eastern 
Mexico and are believed to contribute to the spread 
of cattle tick fever across the landscape,66 advancing 
the notion that non-native species can complicate 
disease transmission patterns. For a thorough 
review of FMDV susceptibility in various wildlife 
species, see ref 43.
A number of cloven-hoofed animals are imported 
into the USA  annually46 and in the event an 
FMD-infected animal was imported, the outbreak 
potential would be heavily dependent on where 
the animal was transported following importation. 
Based on simulation modelling, an infected animal 
that was imported direct to slaughter would have 
less capacity for disease transmission as compared 
with a breeding animal, an animal imported for 
competition or rodeo use, or into a feedlot setting.28–30
Legal movement of animal products, by-products and animal 
feed containing animal products
Currently the USA imports a wide variety of animal 
products, by-products and animal feed containing 
animal products from countries all over the world. 
Animal products, by-products and animal feed 
containing animal products from FMD-endemic 
countries must be mitigated prior to importation using 
a mitigation strategy that is approved, such as heat 
(at a specific temperature for a specified duration), 
pH or chemical treatment. The importation of fresh, 
unprocessed animal products, by-products and animal 
feed containing animal products from FMD-endemic 
countries is strictly prohibited. Imports of this nature 
from FMD-free regions typically require a zoo sanitary 
certificate attesting to the product identity, country of 
origin and that the product has not been exposed to 
unauthorised animal products. Of all animal products, 
by-products and feed imports, those used to feed 
animals are the most important as they represent the 
highest risk for FMDV introduction.
Illegal movement of live animals and their products
Illegally imported products and specimens from 
domestic livestock may be confiscated by the US 
Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). Data provided by CBP depict products 
and specimens from domestic livestock and cervids 
that were confiscated in the cargo or express courier 
environment, which includes both FedEx and DHL, 
or via international mail facilities, including the US 
postal service. Between calendar years 2012 and 2016, 
over 117,000 products and specimens derived from 
domestic livestock and cervids were confiscated by CBP. 
Pig products made up nearly 60 per cent of all seizures 
while bovids, which include cattle, bison, buffalo and 
yak, made up approximately 40 per cent; sheep, goats, 
cervids and unspecified ruminants each made up 
1 per cent or less of all confiscations (figure 1).
The data provided by CBP depict that the continent 
of origin for the majority of products and specimens 
confiscated by CBP is Asia (~52 per cent), which includes 
a number of countries endemic for FMD.67 Africa and 
South America, both of which are endemic for FMDV 
in some or all regions, were the continent of origin for 
a total of 2  per  cent of all confiscated products and 
specimens. Products and specimens from Europe and 
North America comprised approximately 36  per  cent 
of all confiscations, both of which are FMD free. These 
data are summarised in figure 2.
The US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible 
for the confiscation of illegally imported wildlife and 
their products. Data obtained from FWS demonstrated 
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that a variety of products were seized between 2006 
and 2016, ranging from jewellery to medicinal products 
to parts or whole carcasses. For the purpose of the risk 
of FMDV introduction into the USA, carcasses, meat, 
skin, hooves and bones were included in the data 
summary. It is important to note that each confiscation 
was treated as a single event (eg, 10 lb of seized meat 
was treated identically to 100 lb of seized meat) unless 
the measuring unit was a raw number (eg, 10 hides 
were counted as 10, not as 1).
The majority of products seized by FWS were those 
that originated in other North American countries 
(55  per  cent), specifically Canada and Mexico. The 
African continent was responsible for a quarter of 
all cloven-hoofed species product confiscation and 
South America, Europe, Asia, Australia and unknown 
comprised the remaining 20  per  cent. These data 
confirm the suspicion that illegal wildlife and wildlife 
product importation pose a risk for FMDV introduction 
as nearly half of all confiscated products were derived 
from continents which are endemic for FMDV (or of 
unknown origin).
Notably, over a 10-year period for the entire USA, less 
than 2000 wildlife products were confiscated (n=1848). 
In contrast, flights arriving at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle 
airport in Paris from west and central Africa on a single 
carrier (Air France) were estimated to harbour 272 
tons of wildlife meat each year.68 While France likely 
has more flights originating directly from west and 
central African countries than the USA, and while there 
Products from domestic livestock and cervids confiscated
between 2012-2016
Cervids
Swine
Bovine
Sheep
Goats
Unspecified ruminants
Figure 1 A pie chart depicting the types of products confiscated by US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016 (n=117,308).
Continent of origin for products from domestic livestock and cervids
confiscated between 2012-2016
Europe
Australia
South America
Unknown North America
Africa
Asia
Figure 2 A pie chart depicting the continent of origin for the products and specimens confiscated by the US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016 
(n=117,308).
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were  likely more wildlife seizures than were captured 
by the official FWS data, the low number of wildlife 
confiscations still suggests that resources for inspection 
are likely not sufficient to catch many of the products 
entering the USA illegally.
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism, the intentional release or dissemination 
of bacteria, viruses or toxins that cause morbidity or 
mortality events in humans, other animals or plants, 
presents an alternative route for FMD introduction 
into the USA. The breadth of domestic and wildlife 
species susceptible to infection, high morbidity, low 
infectious dose, high shedding capability of infected 
animals, ease of viral collection and crippling economic 
impact associated with an introduction makes FMDV a 
potential candidate for bioterrorism. This risk provides 
an impetus to maintain vigilant surveillance protocols 
in both domestic livestock and wildlife species to ensure 
rapid detection and differential diagnoses.
Factors that complicate eradication efforts following 
introduction
The introduction of FMDV into the USA would be 
devastating for both livestock and producers. If the 
event was limited to domestic livestock, there is 
historical precedent demonstrating that control and 
eradication is possible; however, in the event FMDV 
was either introduced to feral or wild species or spilled 
over from domestic livestock, successful control of the 
disease would become more complicated.69
As outlined by Rhyan and Spraker,70 substantial 
political, technical  and logistical issues arise related 
to disease surveillance and control in wildlife. Often, 
baseline information on the disease and host population 
is lacking and obtaining a reliable population estimate 
can be problematic. Passive surveillance activities 
are fraught with complication because of reliance on 
public reporting, survival behaviours making many 
wild species highly stoic and frequent predation and 
scavenging of a carcass following the death of an animal. 
Active surveillance requires capture or kill techniques 
which are both expensive, invasive and, in many cases, 
highly controversial. In the event of a disease outbreak, 
effective disease containment, efficacious vaccinations 
and/or depopulation techniques in a given area can 
also present financial and logistical challenges.
Feral pigs
Pigs appear to be quite tolerant to FMDV infection via 
inhalation of naturally produced aerosols,71 which 
has been substantiated by the demonstration that the 
porcine upper respiratory tract is less permissive to viral 
inoculation as compared with the upper gastrointestinal 
tract.72 However, once infected, pigs shed 30–100 times 
more virus from the oropharyngeal tonsil epithelium and 
are efficient at spreading FMDV to cattle especially, and 
to a lesser extent, sheep and goats.3 33 73 74 Feral pigs may 
serve as a potential host if FMDV was introduced into 
the USA.33 75 Their uncontrolled movement could result 
in rapid transmission events to domestic livestock and 
wildlife species. A study that evaluated the impact of a 
FMDV introduction from a wild pig into a commercial 
livestock premise in California concluded that FMDV 
introduction into a dairy or beef cattle herd could 
result in a rapidly spreading outbreak.76 Additionally, 
modelling of FMDV transmission in a wild pig-domestic 
cattle ecosystem in Australia demonstrated that in 
the majority of simulations in which cattle-to-cattle, 
cattle-to-pig or pig-to-cattle transmission occurred, 
FMDV was able to establish and transmit.77 In this 
modelling scenario, FMD was self-limiting in the wild 
pigs; however, the most rapid disease control method 
targeted both cattle and wild pigs. In the Strandzha 
Mountains in Bulgaria, wild boar were found to play 
a role, albeit temporally and spatially limited, in the 
FMDV transmission cycle.78 79 The magnitude of wild 
boar involvement in FMDV transmission is believed 
to be heavily dependent on the population size and 
density as well as environmental conditions during 
viral introduction; however, sylvatic FMD outbreaks in 
wild boar and other wild ungulates are likely possible 
in parts of Europe, especially in regions with large, 
dense populations of FMD-susceptible wildlife. Further 
examination of the role of wildlife in the spread of 
FMD in Bulgaria determined that limited spread of the 
virus is possible in wildlife populations and increased 
interaction between domestic and wild animals as 
well as increased population densities may lead to 
lengthened viral circulation.80 This highlights the need 
for robust feral pig population estimates throughout the 
USA.
Furthermore, feral pigs have been found to be 
translocated and intentionally released by citizens in 
an attempt to create local hunting opportunities.33 75 
These types of activities would also complicate FMDV 
eradication in the event feral pigs became infected and 
could facilitate rapid and widespread dissemination 
of the virus across the USA. It is important to note that 
experimental infections in both domestic and feral pigs 
suggest that pigs are unlikely to be competent long-
term carriers of infectious FMDV.37 81 However, feral pigs 
could become infected and significantly complicate 
disease control efforts in domestic livestock via spillover 
and spillback events.
Wildlife species
Experimental infections have demonstrated the 
susceptibility of a number of wild cloven-hoofed species 
in the USA; however, multiple other species of cloven-
hoofed animals are native to the USA, such as moose 
(Alces alces), bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis), mountain 
goats (Oreamnos americanus), and caribou (Rangifer 
tarandus) and muskoxen (Ovibus moschatus) in Alaska. 
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These species are likely to be susceptible to FMDV to 
varying degrees, although no experimental work has 
been conducted. While experimental challenges are 
useful for understanding host-pathogen dynamics, 
they fail to provide other crucial epidemiological 
information relative to interactions between the host, 
pathogen and environment. Furthermore, wildlife 
density on the landscape both independent of, and in 
relation to, domestic livestock is fundamental in order 
to gain a full understanding of the dynamic. In addition, 
zoos, wildlife parks and high fence properties (many in 
Texas) often contain multipleFMDV susceptible species.
Aside from African Cape buffalo, no other wildlife 
species has been shown to play an important role in the 
maintenance of FMDV, despite all seven FMDV serotypes 
having been found in wildlife.43 Clinical disease 
associated with FMDV infection in wildlife species 
ranges from asymptomatic to lethal infections, with 
the majority of gross and histopathological lesions 
resembling those seen in domestic species. Usually 
outbreaks in wildlife are resultant from passive 
spillover events from domestic livestock, and despite 
decades of research, no evidence exists to suggest that 
wildlife species serve as a true reservoir (except for Cape 
buffalo).
Most FMD outbreaks in wildlife are resultant from 
passive spillover events from domestic livestock, 
including in 1924 when there was an FMDV outbreak 
in cattle that spilled over into the mule deer population 
in California, resulting in the culling of 22,000 deer, 
10 per cent of which exhibited typical FMDV lesions.82 
Rapid culling of both cattle and deer resulted in viral 
eradication from both domestic and wild species soon 
thereafter. Furthermore, a model simulating FMDV 
spread in Texas found that both deer and feral pigs may 
amplify virus and contribute to viral maintenance.83 
These findings contradict other available literature 
stating that wildlife species are, for the most part, not 
true reservoirs; however, pathogen transmission is 
heavily dependent on the location(s) of introduction, 
density of susceptible animals, types of animals infected 
and shedding infectious virus, proximity of infected 
and naïve animals and many other factors, suggesting 
that the possibility of short-term FMD maintenance in 
wildlife populations exists.
Discussion and concluding remarks
Due to the breadth of species that are susceptible to 
FMDV infection and the large number of countries 
with endemic disease, an introduction of FMDV, either 
accidental or purposeful, presents a threat to the USA. 
Furthermore, re-establishing FMD-free status following 
an introduction would be substantially more complex 
if the virus spills over (or is introduced) to feral pigs 
or wildlife species. Many regulations and systems are 
in place to prevent the importation of FMDV while 
importing animals and their products via legal channels. 
The illegal importation of animals and their products, 
both wild and domestic species, as well as bioterrorism 
is difficult to control, manage or regulate without 
substantial investment in personnel and resources and 
represents a risk for FMDV importation and subsequent 
introduction.
Future directions and recommendations
FMDV introduction in feral pigs and/or wildlife species 
would heavily complicate eradication.70 One potential 
way to address FMD introduction in wildlife would be 
to use existing hunter check station infrastructure to 
build a means of surveilling wildlife for FMD. Hunter 
check stations are typically administered at the state 
level and were established and maintained primarily 
for regulatory and population management data. Some 
are currently used to evaluate deer for chronic wasting 
disease, bovine tuberculosis and other pathogens, 
but also serve to provide population information to 
wildlife management agencies. In the event of an FMDV 
introduction or if spillover into deer was of heightened 
concern, guidelines could be developed to incorporate 
surveillance for FMD into hunter check stations. Hunter 
check stations could be used over broad areas, but if more 
targeted wildlife surveillance was required, the USDA/
APHIS/Wildlife Services (WS)/National Wildlife Disease 
Program (NWDP) has trained biologists and emergency 
first responders that could target surveillance efforts to 
specific areas in a coordinated effort with a domestic 
animal outbreak response. Field biologists working 
with wildlife and feral pigs could be further trained to 
identify clinical signs of FMDV and examine trapped 
or euthanised wildlife and feral pigs for the presence 
of vesicular lesions. In the event an animal is observed 
with such lesions, further differential diagnostics could 
be taken to determine aetiology.
Zoos as well as animal parks, sanctuaries and 
wildlife reserves, as well as other operations, often 
maintain FMD-susceptible species which could further 
complicate eradication methods in the event of an 
outbreak. Depending on the type of operation, there 
is often very little oversight on the types and numbers 
of animals maintained, and in some cases these exotic 
species escape and establish reproductively active 
populations outside of captivity. The role that  exotic 
wildlife would play in FMD transmission and 
maintenance given a viral introduction is unknown; 
however, control strategies would certainly be further 
complicated. Enhanced databases that maintain what 
types of animals are kept and the numbers maintained, 
for both domestic livestock and exotic species, would 
be useful to evaluate risk and inform control strategies. 
Despite its utility, there are significant privacy concerns 
that may necessitate the use of non-traditional 
approaches. For example, a spatial microsimulation 
model was created using domestic pig farms which 
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attempts to balance privacy concerns with the need for 
robust data.84
Most data suggest that FMD will ultimately be self-
limiting in wildlife and that effective control of FMDV 
in domestic livestock will result in sufficient protection 
for both livestock and wildlife species without 
necessitating intervention on the wildlife side.43 FMD 
would likely also be self-limiting in feral pigs based 
on the data from FMD-infected wild boar abroad79; 
however, these animals do pose a unique problem 
because of their gregarious nature, large litter size and 
abundant geographical distribution, in addition to their 
susceptibility to FMDV and robust shedding patterns 
following infection. Additionally, they have been shown 
to interact freely with domestic pigs in some situations35 
and likely other domestic livestock. The current USDA/
APHIS/Feral Swine Damage Management Program 
is designed to reduce damage associated with feral 
pigs through a variety of means, including removal. 
Disease surveillance programmes, including the USDA/
APHIS/WS/NWDP, are in place for several pathogens 
that pose a risk to humans, domestic livestock and 
wildlife; however, the programme could include FMD 
surveillance in feral pigs in the event of an introduction 
or outbreak.
Active wildlife surveillance could potentially 
incorporate thermography to evaluate hoof 
temperature40 or baited cotton ropes that could 
be evaluated for the presence of live or dead virus 
in saliva.85 86 Rope-in-a-bait sampling has been 
experimentally evaluated using laboratory inoculated 
wild boar and comparisons between the baited rope and 
direct swabbing were found to have similar sensitivity.87 
An additional non-invasive screening method is aerosol 
sampling which has been shown to be an effective 
means of detecting FMDV  in expired air from several 
species of domestic livestock.88 89 Virus detection from 
airway sampling preceded clinical disease in most 
cases which makes it a particularly useful tool for early 
detection.89 Thermography, baited rope and aerosol 
sampling are all non-invasive techniques and could be 
used in conjunction with other surveillance methods. 
Studies on using baited cotton ropes for wildlife 
FMDV surveillance could identify robust and efficient 
methodologies in diagnostic testing and experimental 
designs for their use on the landscape. Depending on 
terrain and climate it is likely that variation will exist 
for optimal placement in different geographical regions 
and with differing wildlife densities and these need to 
be elucidated prior to use. Aerosol sampling in wildlife 
would present significant challenges as individual 
animals would need to be caught and restrained; 
however, it may be a favourable surveillance method, 
especially with endangered or charismatic wildlife 
species.
Despite the presence of an FMD vaccine bank and a 
conditionally licensed product in the USA in the event of 
an outbreak, the use of vaccines is quite controversial. As 
per the OIE guidelines, the return to free status following 
an outbreak of FMD requires substantial oversight and 
is a lengthy process,90 which is exacerbated by the 
use of vaccines. Administering vaccines necessitates 
significant resources and infrastructure aside from 
having sufficient vaccine quantities that can be 
delivered quickly, including regulatory framework; 
animal identification and tracking systems; and 
surveillance and control measures such as biosecurity, 
cleaning and disinfection protocols. Furthermore, the 
interface between state and federal agencies as well as 
private animal owners is quite complex and potentially 
reflects competing interests. The determination of 
vaccine efficacy in wildlife species may be important in 
the event the virus was to be introduced or spilled over, 
especially if large, charismatic or endangered species 
were involved. To date, FMD vaccines have not been 
evaluated in any wildlife species.
The USA (and other FMD-free countries) have 
operated under a ‘stamping out’ protocol following the 
introduction of FMDV which involves mass depopulation 
of infected and potentially exposed animals. This 
method has been adopted due, in part, to the inability 
of the current vaccines to prevent primary infection,91 92 
difficulty with viral persistence92 93 and because of the 
implications vaccine usage has on international trade of 
domestic animal products.94 Stamping out is considered 
to be highly efficacious when the virus is in a somewhat 
focal region and restricted to domestic species or a small 
number of wildlife (eg, 1924 outbreak in California).95 
However, stamping out becomes complicated if the virus 
is widespread, infects a large number of animals, or 
feral pigs and/or wildlife are heavily involved for several 
reasons: (1) cost, (2) environmental damage associated 
with the disposal of a huge number of carcasses, (3) 
inability to find and remove all infected animals, (4) 
valuable genetics, especially for native wildlife species 
and zoo animals, and (5) public perception associated 
with large-scale removal of charismatic wildlife species. 
Therefore, avoiding widespread infection in wildlife is 
key. This could be accomplished, in part, by having 
a clear strategy for vigilant surveillance in wildlife, 
combined with continued training for field personnel 
in differential diagnosis of vesicular diseases and 
validated diagnostics for wildlife.
In summary, our review of the literature related 
to FMDV infection in wildlife species in the USA has 
generated a number of recommendations that would 
be useful in an outbreak scenario and to better control 
and eradicate the virus in the event it spilled into wild 
or feral animals. Databases containing information 
about the types and numbers of cloven-hoofed animals 
maintained at each property, including both domestic 
livestock and exotic wildlife imported for sport or 
pleasure, are essential for rapidly assessing risk or 
mobilising control efforts following an outbreak. 
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The development of non-invasive surveillance 
methods, such as baited ropes, aerosol sampling and 
thermography, is important as traditional sampling 
methods for wild and feral species are both labour and 
cost intensive which minimises its utility. Studying 
vaccine efficacy in susceptible US wildlife species, 
such as mule and white-tailed deer, bison, pronghorn 
antelope and a number of zoo animals, may be a useful 
research endeavour in the event of a national outbreak 
scenario in which a stamping out approach would be 
infeasible. Additionally, characterising and validating 
PCR methods in wildlife would be crucial to the 
development of robust diagnostics.
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